


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Book review

Adolph Reed Jr.

^a Boulder

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BOOK REVIEW

Without Justice For All: The New Liberalism and Our Retreat from Racial Equality, edited by Adolph Reed, Jr. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999, 460 pages, \$28.00 (cloth).

During the late 1980s when I returned to academia to embark upon a second doctoral program, I was stunned by the change in the tone of the scholarly work on race, racism, and race relations. When I left academia in the early 1970s to work full-time in the movement for social change, I thought that I could contribute more effectively by taking my skills into the movement, but I was encouraged by the high quality of the work on race. Robert Allen's *Black Awakening in Capitalist America*, Robert Blauner's *Racial Oppression in America*, James Geschwender's *Racial Stratification in America*, Harold Cruse's "Revolutionary Nationalism and the Afro-American," and Harold Baron's "The Demand for Black Labor," all seemed to demonstrate that the analysis of racism was at the top of its form and scholars would deepen and build upon the insights of these works.

During the 1980s the radical movements of the 1960s and 1970s began to collapse. Later the organizations of the Old Left followed suit. I returned to the academy to try to understand what had happened. In my first semester I was strongly encouraged to read two works by William Julius Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race* and *The Truly Disadvantaged*. While my professor seemed sympathetic to Wilson, I was shocked at the narrowing of vision reflected in these works, and soon came to see that Wilson's work represented a developing orthodoxy among Left Liberal scholars who sought to regain political ground on the right by downplaying the issue of race. I understood the politics of the work, but I did not consider these works to constitute a serious analysis of race and racism.

By the end of the decade I began to read a number of scholars who were also critical of this new orthodoxy. Stephen Steinberg, Adolph Reed, Jr., Micaela di Leonardo, and Dennis Judd seemed the most notable of these critics. Reed and di Leonardo published biting polemics. Steinberg's critiques were unrelenting and merciless, constituting the core of this new criticism (see his *Turning Back: The Retreat from Racial Justice in American Thought and Policy*, 1994).

Critics of the new liberalism were recently brought together in a new volume edited by Adolph Reed, Jr., *Without Justice For All: The New Liberalism and the Retreat From Racial Equality*. This book is a powerful, elegant, and evocative critique, which simultaneously dissects, debunks, and criticizes the new liberalism, while reaffirming the moral vision needed for the construction of a just, democratic, and egalitarian society. Scholarly justification of racial myths are powerfully laid to rest in every chapter of this book, from family values, to the good old days of the meritocracy, to the days when whites made it out of the inner city to the suburbs all on their own.

Micaela di Leonardo, ever the master polemicist, takes no prisoners as she forcefully dissects the purveyors of racist and underclass ideology. She is at her best as she unmasks those who

have disingenuously reconstructed the discourse about white ethnics to create an imagined past for the purposes of denigrating the current (Black and Latino) residents of the bottom tier. While recalling the chastising tone of the literature about the Jewish, Italian, and Irish residents of yesteryear's inner city, she notes their conversion into "ethnic heroes" whose lives are said to be rooted in the family, and a strong sense of community integrity and group identity. But Steinberg is probably closer to the truth, she offers, when he pointed out "the Poles and Slavs in Chicago, like the Irish in Boston, and the Jews in Forest Hills, rarely experience their ethnicity so acutely as when threatened with *racial* integration" [my emphasis] (p. 45).

Another aspect of this glorification of white ethnicity is the use of women's culture among these groups as a counter to feminist challenges to male privilege and to women's right to equal participation in the workforce. While the women's culture movement seems to give credit to the so-called feminine virtues of nurturance, intuition, and caring, they also refocus away from the real world of violence against women, the feminization of poverty, the double shift, and the glass ceiling. To the extent that women are invited into the public sphere it is because their feminine qualities will improve things, not because they have a right to be there.

But this may also serve as women's prison, a role which ties her to the household and other locations outside the public sphere. Furthermore the extolling of these feminine virtues may well serve as an ideological veil for deriding those selfish elements of our society who are demanding entitlements instead of accepting social responsibility.

Brett Williams contends the 1950s ideal family is the centerpiece of family values rhetoric yet in contrast to the self-reliance today embedded in this idealized image, it was largely the product the GI Bill and FHA financing of suburban housing restricted almost entirely to whites. The white middle class is the product of a segregated social welfare system. But the nostalgia for this so-called ideal family should not obscure that so many felt suffocated and abused in these families. Homophobia and misogyny were rife and there existed an unspeakable cruelty toward the mentally ill and teenage mothers as well.

The Black golden age was based on racially segregated neighborhoods which enforced a diversity of social class backgrounds upon all Black communities. The presence of upper-middle class and middle class Blacks are said to provide stability and reinforce mainstream norms and behavior patterns. But with desegregation the higher class Blacks moved out of the inner city leaving the inner city poor with no role models to model marriage, obedience, and self-esteem. Williams argues that much of the evidence for this is simply anecdotal, there being no real evidence supporting this notion of harmonious, friendly class emulation. On the contrary, the evidence shows a great deal of interclass animosity.

Williams concludes in the light of the real facts, "to praise yesterday's white families for building self-reliance and the Black families for nurturing community allows critics to blame today's poor families for a deteriorating social fabric. All three claims are scandalous. But when the family is holy, race and class become epiphenomenal." (p. 87). Williams calls for programs that support the families and households that we chose to build and let the old days go.

Michael K. Brown confronts the notion that the Great Society induced dependence on welfare, eroded work incentives, and facilitated moral laxness. Brown argues that conservatives gave the early 19th century idea that relief and social welfare had debilitating effects on the poor a new twist by linking it to race. In this case the idea of a culture of poverty fused with long-standing stereotypes of Blacks. A new liberalism rose like a phoenix from the ashes of the conservative onslaught of the 1970s and 1980s with a new face. These new liberals responded by apologizing for the excesses of the Great Society and admitting the behavioral problems of the poor. They accused the liberals of the 1960s of undermining the New Deal by catering to the demands of Blacks and other special interests, and called for universalistic (or race neutral) social policies in place of the race specific policies of the Great Society.

Brown questions the notion that one can so simply fashion race neutral social policies in a racially stratified society. He argues that the connection between race and social policy has been at the center of the American welfare state since the New Deal. Brown skillfully narrates the ways in which racial stigmatization became an attachment to programs in which Blacks were significant participants. During the New Deal Blacks depended on relief more than whites because of their tenuous connection to labor markets and their exclusion from employment which made them eligible for social insurance programs. "The exclusion of Black agricultural and domestic workers from unemployment and old age insurance, The Wagner Act, and the Fair Labor and Standards Act put almost three-fifths of the Black labor force outside the main welfare state policies." (p. 104). Black sharecroppers were considered self-employed. Because of wage requirements, 42 percent of Blacks in covered industries were uninsured, compared to 20 percent of whites. Blacks were thus forced to depend on relief much more than whites, and thus reinforced age-old stereotypes about dependency. The concentration of Blacks on work relief, general relief, and public assistance raised concerns about the impact of prolonged dependency on the structure of the Black family. But in contrast to popular perceptions, the welfare explosion of the late 1960s benefitted mainly white families who saw an 80 percent increase in their caseload, compared to a 2 percent increase for Blacks.

Brown concludes that severing the link between race and dependence will come about only as a consequence of transforming the racial practices of our society. "Racism," she writes, "cannot be removed by ignoring it, despite the ideology of a color-blind society" (p. 122).

Dennis Judd contrasts the symbolic politics of representation vis à vis the Democratic Party versus the failure of either party to address the institutional discrimination which underwrote the ghettoization of the nation's Black population during the 20th century. In contrast to recognition and representation, by the 1920s both parties accepted the fundamental law of the real estate industry that the value of property depended on the homogeneity of neighborhoods. Blacks were therefore viewed as a threat to property values. This maxim was enforced unfailingly. Those who violated it were subject to expulsion from local real estate boards. Those who were not affiliated with local boards depended on these boards for referrals. This practice was integral to the 1934 National Housing Act's Federal Housing Administration (FHA) Loans and the 1944 Servicemen's Adjustment Act's Veteran's Administration (VA) Loans. Nearly all of the new homes underwritten by FHA-VA were built in the suburbs. Between 1946 and 1959 less than 2 percent of all the housing financed with federal mortgage assistance went to Blacks. In 1960 not a single Black family lived among the 82,000 residents of Levittown in suburban Long Island near New York City.

Restrictive policies which kept Blacks out of the suburbs were complemented by policies for inner city revitalization, slum clearance, and public housing. Urban Renewal had been trumpeted as a design for inner city revitalization, slum removal, and provision of housing for the inner city poor. But the economic priorities quickly trumped the social objectives of this program, as businesses used the program to gain access to central city property and remove the slum residents who in their view made the land less desirable. During the life of this program \$35.8 billion had been committed in 524 projects, reducing hundreds of square blocks in central cities to rubble. Blacks were relocated to new slums, keeping one step ahead of the bulldozer. By 1961 126,000 units had been demolished, but only 28,000 public housing units were constructed to replace them. A San Francisco Urban Renewal Program official articulated the true rationale of these programs: "This land is too valuable to permit poor people to park on it" (p. 133).

The exclusion of Blacks from the suburbs had a payoff from the realtors in that it provided a large pool of buyers for middle class housing targeted for Blockbusting. This was a means of accelerating home sales in areas where a house-hungry Black family would buy in a white

neighborhood, provoking panic in the white home owners who were then stampeded into selling their homes at low prices, which were in turn sold to Black families at high prices.

When in 1968 Congress finally moved to outlaw housing discrimination by passing the Federal Fair Housing Act it was too little, too late. Segregation in housing had become institutionalized and the individualized antidiscrimination measures had some impact but did not begin to attain the magnitude needed to overcome institutionalized racism in the housing market. Home ownership had become the main source of capital worth and the means by which a family could send their children to college and leave something for the next generation. Home ownership in the suburbs were intimately connected to life chances.

After 1968 Black suburbanization increased significantly but tended to replicate existing patterns of residential mobility, with Blacks moving into inner-ring suburbs and whites moving to outer-ring suburbs. Today 86 percent of suburban whites live in municipalities with Black populations of less than one percent (p. 145).

Mimi Abramovitz and Amy Withorn take a close look at President Clinton's abolition of "welfare as we know it." David Ellwood, Clinton's man welfare reform argued that income support programs, especially public assistance conflicted with the core American values: "individual autonomy, the virtue of work, the primacy of the family, and the desire for community." According to Ellwood social policy should come closer to the American ideal "that people who strive and who meet reasonable social responsibilities will be able to achieve at least a modest level of dignity and security" (p. 163). He simply ignored the impact of race, class, and gender on the realization of these values.

An important element of the new liberalism's retreat from social redistributive policies is that such policies are politically unfeasible. By focusing on middle and working class citizens, new liberals see a trickle down affect for the poor. But the politics of welfare reform from Reagan onward has sought to promote economic recovery by cheapening the cost of labor for employers, and undercutting the labor force bargaining power of all labor.

Larry Bennett and Adolph Reed, Jr. report on an urban renewal project on the near North Side of Chicago called the Cabrini-Green neighborhood. The Near North Redevelopment Initiative (NNRI) sought to reshape the low income Cabrini-Green area into a mixed-income neighborhood. But public officials working out of William Julius Wilson's dogma about social isolation, and lack of family and friendship networks actually threatens to displace the low income populations of Cabrini-Green and thus "pulling apart the very networks of social and family ties that allow low-income families in Cabrini-Green to survive" (p. 208). Bennett and Reed carefully demonstrate how the NNRI plan has all the markings of a sophisticated land grab, displacing and disrupting poor communities in the process. Chicago's political, civic, and economic elite have long speculated on how they could remove the aging public housing project and thereby contribute to the real estate upgrading of the Near North Side.

Bennett and Reed decry the attempt of some to demonize the poor residents of Cabrini-Green and thus exclude them from the planning process. They call for the inclusion of all relevant parties, particularly the current residents of Cabrini-Green. They point out that in contrast to stereotypes, there is a vital Cabrini-Green community which is largely sustained by informal friendship-defined and family-defined networks. Therefore they call upon the NNRI to focus on institution-building, social services, and economic development among the existing residents.

Stephen Steinberg argues that racial oppression in the U.S. is based on the reproduction over time of a racial division of labor which consigns most Blacks to the least desirable jobs or excludes them from legitimate employment altogether. This racial division of labor has its origins in slavery. Half a million Africans were imported to provide cheap labor for the plantation system in the south. When slavery ended the racial division of labor did not end. The main reason for this is that northern industries did not integrate Blacks into their

labor forces but relied on European immigrant labor, while Blacks were consigned to agricultural labor in the south. This pattern lasted until World War II, when Blacks were discharged from southern agriculture as a consequence of the mechanization of labor. Blacks who were freed from the sharecropping and debt peonage in the south were encouraged to move north to obtain jobs.

What happened when Blacks arrived in the north? They faced a labor market controlled by immigrant workers through nepotism and racial exclusion. Steinberg argues that since 1965 immigration policy has encouraged the influx of more than 12 million people, so that at the same time that we are exporting jobs we are importing workers. Steinberg argues that these workers not only take jobs spurned by native workers, but also more coveted jobs in construction, hotels and restaurants, health care, and building management.

Despite whatever gains have been made by the Black middle class, the racial division of labor is still intact, with as many as half of Black men of working age lacking steady employment. Many others work at poverty wages or lack job security and health benefits, or are only a paycheck or two away from poverty. In Steinberg's view the problems that beset Black communities are intertwined with the job crisis we have just briefly discussed.

Steinberg argues that the nation should have the common decency to provide jobs at decent wages for the descendants of its slaves who continue to be relegated to the fringes of the job market. Instead there has emerged a punitive and self-serving mythology which alleges that Blacks are inefficient and unproductive workers, deficient in the work habits and moral qualities that have enabled other groups to climb up from poverty.

While this has long been the swan song of the right, among whom he counts Nathan Glazer, Thomas Sowell, Shelby Steele, and others, there is an echo or a variant of this argument on the Left. Steinberg provides the most articulate critique of what he calls "the liberal retreat from race," found most persuasively in the work of William Julius Wilson and Cornel West. Steinberg calls for a frontal assault on the racial division of labor such as we have in affirmative action. He contends that affirmative action has opened up access to mainstream occupations, not just in the professions and the corporations but also in the blue collar and government jobs that is the backbone of Black employment. He holds that the attack on affirmative action is reminiscent of the retrenchment at the end of the 19th century, when the gains of reconstruction were aggressively and brutally erased to be supplanted by the mean spirited and vicious system of Jim Crow. While it is not likely that there will be a return to legally sanctioned segregation, Steinberg argues the racial division of labor will be reinforced by a system which pretends to be blind to race, and does its work under the guise of simply dealing with bad behavior.

Alex Willingham's contribution contends that the right to vote did not impact the practice of racial discrimination nor the accrued advantages of those who had long been involved in the body politic. Civil Rights activists thus sought reforms in voting rights that would allow disadvantaged minorities to obtain public office, such as switching from at-large to district voting and changing the boundaries of districts to be in accord with existing racially segregated neighborhoods.

These electoral reforms came under attack in the late 1980s by those who viewed a deracialized America under threat from race based electoral organizing, sewing disunity and undermining our sense of national purpose. Most would have to struggle to take seriously that it is now the conservative arch opponents of desegregation who are now calling for a mending of the fictive national fabric. In reality retrograde racial attitudes are the basis of the success of politicians from North Carolina to Massachusetts who have difficulty obtaining electoral majorities without playing the race card recently of Willie Horton fame.

Preston Smith examines the proliferation of self-help ideologies among the new Black privatists. The discourse articulated by these new Black conservatives restricts the actions of the

Black poor to private bootstrap activity on the one hand and self destructive behavior on the other. While presenting themselves as advocates of grassroots empowerment and as an alternative to the “tired old” strategies of the civil rights establishment, Glenn Loury names the real tune they are playing. Loury sees something of historical proportions: “a decoupling of the interests of the poor from the agenda of the anticapitalist, envy-mongering left” (p. 278). While policy implications of the Black conservatives are touted as revolutionary, their impact on the material conditions of the inner city poor are minimal. The bottom line of these programs is that property ownership changes behavior. Moral rehabilitation and not economic development is the real goal of this agenda. This strategy, he argues is less adversarial in tone, and its executives will not be making demands upon the state for redistribution of resources, but will stress stretching their threadbare organizational and community resources. Smith places self-help, privatism, and Black conservatism in clear relief, as a mechanism for underwriting the corporate and state disinvestment in inner city Black communities.

Another mechanism for disarming the inner city poor has been the mobilization of a Black manhood movement to come to grips with the so-called “crisis of the Black male.” While Black men are beset with an array of pressing problems specific to males, for the most part in the inner city, the manhood movement in and of itself is largely based upon patriarchal assumptions. But the logic is revealed in Farrakhan’s Million Man March statement “Black man clean up . . . and the world will respect and honor you.” (p. 323). Farrakhan, she suggests, offered himself up as the new leader who will not burden the state with the demands of its Black citizens.

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Stories of Transformative Justice, by Ruth Morris, Canadian Scholars’ Press, Inc., 2000,
 261 pages, \$19.95 Canadian, \$14.95 U.S. (paper)

Stories of Transformative Justice is a book of shared experiences, accounts of personal healing, and a call to action in the transformation of our justice system from retributive to transformative, a restorative justice process which considers the histories of the victim, offender, and community. Ruth Morris has selected her stories so that each provides the reader with a message, and in this well-organized book the messages are categorized into a variety of themes that are essential to our understanding of Morris’ philosophy of life as well as the transformative justice process. Morris uses the messages that each story imparts to inspire the reader to act to reform the social order on a macro level, as well as transform us on a personal level. Toward that end, Morris develops competing themes that tell us not only what is wrong with our current justice system and our economy, political system, and personal lives, but also what should be done to right the wrongs. She advocates justice systems that are community based (inclusionary) rather than prison based (exclusionary), transformative rather than retributive, and that favor deinstitutionalization rather than institutionalization. On a personal level, Morris advocates moving from the excesses of materialism toward spiritual growth, from being vengeful to forgiving, from suspicious to trusting, and from politically inactive to active to achieve transformation in our personal lives.

The book consists of three parts. Part I defines transformative justice, introduces the importance of listening to victims and offenders, and of learning about their personal needs in resolving the hurt caused by a crime. Part II speaks to the role of the community in the transformative justice process, relating stories from across the globe. This section includes the most important chapter of the book, that of forgiveness. Here Morris transitions us from forgiving acts of betrayal on a personal level to acts of murder, and even to forgiving acts of racism and genocide. Part III of the book is a call to action. In this section, Morris tells us what we can do to transform our lives as well as our social, political, and economic systems.

In the first chapter, Morris lays the foundation for understanding the differences between retributive justice and transformative justice, emphasizing the distinction between transformative and restorative justice processes. She introduces an important theme in the book, that of distributive injustice, *i.e.*, the fact that the few have access to great wealth, while the many are impoverished. She makes a strong case for the failure of our existing justice system to rehabilitate prisoners and meet victims' needs for restitution, recognition of suffering, and support from the community. After providing a list of alternatives to imprisonment, Morris introduces the first of many stories in this book, a personal account of how she moved from "Misery Justice" to "Social Transformation." She also refers to her religious commitment as a Quaker, a source of strong support to her throughout her life.

It is in the second and third chapters where Morris develops her stories and inspires the reader through touching accounts of forgiveness, understanding, and belief in the goodness of people. With each story there is a lesson to be learned. While some of her accounts of transformative justice processes are successfully resolved, Morris does not sugarcoat her experiences. Indeed, there are examples of failed attempts at offender rehabilitation and stories of Morris' own trials in advocating her cause. Yet, even from these experiences, Morris teaches us to depersonalize our failures, learn from them, and move on. The final chapter of Part I is a call to action. If we are to move offenders to a system of community inclusion, they must have a safe, caring place to stay and be provided work. Morris and many of her friends have opened up their homes to "guests" and sought work for them. In her closing remarks, Morris asks for our commitment to a cause of good will and reassures us that the power of change is within our grasp.

In Part II, Morris expands the umbrella of transformative justice to include the wider community, using stories from Africa, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and the United States. With each story, she emphasizes the positive effects of transformative justice on the victim, offender, family, and community, while at the same time comparing these outcomes with our current flawed system of justice. She reproaches our system for incarcerating people without helping them, housing people with mental illness in prisons, and imposing Eurocentric forms of justice on indigenous peoples.

While each victim has the right to ask for justice, each victim also holds the power to forgive the offender. This is an awesome responsibility since without forgiveness there is no transformation of justice. Yet, there are no limits to our capacity to forgive. Through her stories, Morris tells us that people can forgive others' acts of theft, betrayal, violence and murder and that this can be done on an individual level or by entire classes and races of people. Thus, Morris relates stories of people who have forgiven others for destroying families and for acts of mass racism and genocide. Here, Morris draws much strength from her faith in god. To her, forgiveness and love are linked and can only derive from a divine source.

Part III of her book tells us how and why we should transform our penal system and our economic and political institutions. People who believe in transformative justice can involve prisoners, victims, and their families in their lives and educate others about the failures of our retributive justice system. Morris emphasizes the majority (90%) of non-violent people incarcerated in prison today, rather than focusing on the small group of violent offenders in our

prisons who are sensationalized by the media. She advocates for the abolition of prisons for cheaper, safer, and more effective community alternatives and provides the reader with eight activities that work toward transformative justice.

In Chapter 8, Morris advocates for the transformation of our political and economic systems. In this brief chapter, she attacks corporations for creating huge gaps between the “super-rich” and the abject poor, for polluting our world, and harming our health. It is here that she advocates we relinquish material desires for the economics of care and the economics of enough and provides seven steps by which this can be accomplished. Some of these steps include changing our political system to a democracy of proportional representation, revamping the laws for corporations, exposing transnational corporations for their evil practices, and fighting for consumers through boycotts of goods and through dissemination of information through the internet. Her final chapter summarizes key points from the book.

This volume is based on a collection of stories from Morris’ personal diary, and includes letters from victims, offenders, friends, and co-workers, as well as speeches, poems, and passages from the Bible. Her use of these tools creates a realistic account of the capabilities of transformative justice. Morris is truly an inspirational writer and person. While she receives inspiration from her god, she asks the reader to do so as well. Yet, her god is not the god of most.

While Morris is convincing with regard to the capabilities of the transformative justice process and says it can work in any situation, she excludes multi-national and national corporations in this process. At the end of her book, she asks for the transformation of our penal system and our political and economic institutions, not through the use of transformative justice processes, but through direct action such as boycotts and protest, community education, and lobbying. The implication is that corporations, inherently in the business of greed economics, are beyond transformative justice processes and must be controlled in other ways. Her solutions seem out of place within the scope of a capitalistic ideology that is embraced by much of the world, both rich and poor. She blames the media for casting a spell over us without considering that in capitalist societies all institutions create a hegemony that makes us believe that capitalism works for our good, not our demise.

Finally, her book is a personal perspective. Morris is certainly credible when she relates accounts of the power of forgiveness in her interactions with victims, offenders, and their families. Here she uses letters and poems written by actors in each criminal drama, which verify people’s feelings. Yet, when she describes forgiveness for racism and for atrocities of the holocaust, we have only her interpretation. For example, when she heard Elie Wiesel speak she says, “Wiesel’s face was the first I saw that told the story of the power of really deep forgiveness; forgiveness of the greatest crimes imaginable” (p. 201). Was that truly forgiveness on Wiesel’s face? In personal correspondence with Wiesel he writes, “No one authorized me to forgive the killers . . . only the dead could but they are dead” (Wiesel, personal correspondence, August 29, 2000).

Within the context of her community and religion, Morris attacks the very core of our social system and asks us to change it, for the better. Who can argue with a call to action to create a world in which there is enough to supply the basic needs of everyone, in which there is full employment and adequate income for all, and which preserves our environment for future generations? Her stories of transformative justice show us a way to transform our world.

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Interracial Justice. Conflict & Reconciliation in Post-Civil Rights America by Eric K. Yamamoto, New York: New York University Press, 1999, pp. 330 pages, \$29.95 (cloth).

In his recent book, *Interracial Justice*, Professor Eric K. Yamamoto extends the work that he has explored in previous law review articles. He describes fully the problem of interracial relations (or what he calls “interracial justice”) confronting the United States as we move away from the simplistic black/white racial construct of the 1960s. Yamamoto addresses interracial justice in a climate where whites are claiming reverse discrimination and where communities of color are constantly pitted against each other. The author is a pioneer in his own right in extending the scope of restorative justice literature beyond the theoretical and into the practical. Yamamoto asks the difficult questions that most would shy away from for fear it will start a deeper conflict between groups (thus airing “dirty laundry”). Questions such as: Why did a large percentage of African Americans and Asian Americans vote in favor of Proposition 187 (the “anti-immigrant” measure in California)? What is the dynamic in the conflict occurring between immigrant communities of Haitian and Cuban backgrounds in Miami? Why did Asian Americans in San Francisco sue Lowell High School over its admissions set-aside plan? As he points out, these questions and many more, along with its assumptions must be answered by the groups in conflict in order for true reconciliation to take place between parties.

Employing a race praxis approach that Yamamoto defines as a “critical pragmatic process of race theory generation and translation, practical engagement, material change, and reflection” (p. 10), he describes his method to explore and hopefully achieve possible resolutions towards racial healing. The multi-prong approach takes us through a process of: (1) “recognition” (asking people outside of the victim group to acknowledge and understand the pain and hope of the victims); (2) “responsibility” (in the struggle over identity and power, racial groups can be both victims in some relationships and perpetrators in other circumstances); (3) “reconstruction” (requiring positive actions on the part of the non-victim groups with a goal towards healing the social and psychological wounds of the disabled group); and (4) “reparation” (a group effort at seeking to correct the harm done to the victims in order to better their current conditions).

Although Yamamoto is a law professor by trade he draws upon disciplines aside from the law, including theology, social psychology, peace studies, indigenous healing practices, and anecdotes to assist in the description and development of his praxis. He is wise in the use of this multi-disciplinary approach since he points out the many limitations of the law towards justice and racial healing. Through his theorizing of the above praxis and his discussions of various cases of conflict Yamamoto hopes to achieve a “how to” – an approach for practitioners to begin the group dialogue and go to the heart of the conflict between groups. Yamamoto is articulate in taking seemingly divergent examples from across the country and the globe and subjects these cases of interracial conflict to the scrutiny of his praxis, thus putting them into a context for us to examine. Yamamoto is at his best in describing a conflict in his home base of Hawaii which occurred between Asian American churches and their resolution of apology to Native Hawaiians. He brings to light a conflict where most would consider Hawaii as a cultural model and interracial paradise where all cultures are respected and celebrated. Yamamoto dispels this myth by describing how Native Hawaiians have been annihilated in many ways (physically, culturally, linguistically, etc.) by the U.S. Government and through collaboration with U.S. private corporations. This interracial justice conflict involves the complicity of other Asian Pacific American groups that either stood by while the above destruction took place, or worst yet benefited from the exploitation suffered by Native Hawaiians.

Yamamoto also excels in the analysis of African American/Korean American relations. Through the use of one case (the “hat shop controversy”) he examines the myriad of dynamics occurring and comments on how a utilization of the praxis would have enhanced race relations and the ultimate outcome of this case. This is a superior analysis that displays Yamamoto’s insight into an increasingly common problem. This case study alone ought to be required reading for all conducting work on interracial conflicts.

In his Introduction, Yamamoto informs us that the caveat is that the praxis is still in development. As such, the devil is in the details. This is where the weak points in the book are and where Yamamoto will hopefully build on in the future through an application of race praxis. For example, his section about group responsibility is extremely important. When it comes to restorative justice the key is having a whole group or society acknowledge their part in the “wrong” and their participation in the remedy. One aspect of restorative justice is that of reparations. Presently, the prevailing problem with affirmative action is that a large segment of our society refuses to acknowledge our part and therefore responsibility in the problems of the past. As such, the attempt at a racial remedy is attacked. Yamamoto describes how western or U.S. conceptions of responsibility lie much more with the individual than with the group as a whole. He recognizes how people’s response to reparations will be framed through narrow legalistic objections, but if the goal is to encourage fuller participation in restorative justice then – in the future – Yamamoto will need to give more focus and refinement on how to answer or react to these critical responses.

Yamamoto rightfully points out that empty apologies are meaningless if there are no measures in attempting to make the victims whole. Yet understanding that one aspect of human nature is to be selfish, Yamamoto will need to provide guidance to some practical aspects of his restorative justice model. For example, one current criticism of affirmative action is that we do not need it because systemic racism is no longer present, so how long should remedial measures last? When is a group “restored?” How do we measure the amount of “reparations?” For instance, it is much easier in egregious instances, such as the Japanese American internment or the killings of African Americans in Tulsa, Oklahoma, for the government to issue an apology and perhaps come to some calculation of a reparation amount? The time of these incidents was not that long ago and survivors can still be found. But race praxis is much more difficult to implement in instances where the victims are generations removed from the actual act, yet may still suffer from the legacies of racism. How do we trace such a link? Such are the practical and legalistic problems that lie ahead for practitioners taking up Yamamoto’s praxis.

It is insufficient to respond to objectors of reparations by merely asking them the question: “Will reparation help heal intergroup wounds and establish or restore right relationships?” (p. 206). Unfortunately, the prevailing mode of society appears to be one that wishes to simply “move on and forget about the past.” What is the process by which to convince people that restoration is the key to a healthy future for our society? How does an advocate of race praxis respond to someone unwilling to participate since all s/he receives in return is the usual pat legalistic response that they were not responsible for the act? For race praxis not to become merely another theory but a workable model, Yamamoto will need to aid practitioners by providing helpful hints or examples, especially in this area of responses or motivations for group participation. I suggest the above since Yamamoto himself points out that theory begetting more theory is a waste of time and effort, but theory that promotes practice is certainly a worthwhile pursuit.

In the last analysis of a case study Yamamoto focuses on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. Here, the limits of race praxis are evident as Yamamoto describes how whites would not confess (“agency and responsibility”) their involvement in human rights violations, and when they did an ulterior motive, receiving amnesty for their

crimes, was involved. Yamamoto acknowledges this limitation but suggests that “thoughtful inquiry into each of a controversy’s four dimensions of recognition, responsibility, reconstruction, and reparation offers at least partial illumination of the prospects for interracial healing” (p. 271). Yamamoto is right on the mark on this point. Race praxis is certainly a worthy pursuit, since there are seemingly few other models of interracial justice that we can utilize or experiment with. A further development of this praxis would entail actual detailed accounts of practitioners attempting to implement this praxis along with a description of what pitfalls one might encounter. Yamamoto has taken an important first step here, it will be up to him as well as others to take up race praxis and further refine it in an effort towards a workable model for racial healing. The ultimate proof, however, remains with practitioners who take up race praxis and experiment with its effectiveness.

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Sex and Social Justice by Martha C. Nussbaum, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, ix + 476 pp, \$35.00 (cloth).

What is the relationship between sex and justice? Such is the deceptively simple question posed but not necessarily answered by this volume. Rather than providing simple answers, the essays presented here address this question from a number of different angles, exposing multiple meanings of both sex and justice and providing numerous viewpoints from which to address the relationship(s) between the two. With a philosopher’s faith in reason, Martha Nussbaum questions feminist thought on a variety of levels and defends the philosophical mode as a way to confront real injustice.

In an introduction that contemplates the relationship between “Feminism, Internationalism, [and] Liberalism,” Nussbaum declares that she subscribes to a “distinctive conception of feminism” that combines internationalism, humanism, and liberalism and that is both “concerned with the social shaping of preference and desire” and “concerned with sympathetic understanding” (p. 6). She characterizes herself as a radical feminist who works in the liberal tradition of political philosophy. From this perspective, she argues for the value of analytic philosophy to feminist politics and for the power of reason in defending human rights.

Composed almost entirely of previously published essays that have been substantially reworked for republication, the book is divided into two sections. The first, entitled simply “Justice,” begins with four essays that address the issue of human dignity from the perspective of the relationship between Western liberal concepts of rights and the diverse contexts presented by an international perspective. Specifically, Nussbaum addresses the question of how liberal rights can operate in developing countries such as India and Bangladesh. The first essay, “Women and Cultural Universals,” proposes a list of minimal requirements for human functioning as a first step toward creating a universal concept of human rights. Such requirements include ten human functional capabilities that outline areas – ranging from life, health, and bodily integrity to emotion, reason, and play – in which Nussbaum

argues that human beings should be able to exercise liberty. Having established these capabilities as the standard for her definition of basic human dignity, she goes on in her second essay, “The Feminist Critique of Liberalism,” to claim that women around the world are using the language of liberalism and that Western feminists should reassess their critique of liberal individualism as a model for feminist politics. Locating her own thought within the tradition of Kantian liberalism found in the political thought of John Rawls and the classical utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill, she argues that liberalism’s failures with regard to women are not intrinsic to liberalism but simply the result of failure to follow liberal ideas to their own radical conclusions. She advocates a liberalism informed by feminism and therefore closer to its own goals. From this foundation, Nussbaum addresses two further international cases. In an essay on “Religion and Women’s Human Rights,” she asks whether religious freedom should trump other liberties. She concludes to the contrary that religion should be subordinate to civil law in order to ensure that religions cannot threaten basic human rights. Similarly, in an essay entitled “Judging Other Cultures: The Case of Genital Mutilation,” she argues that cultural practices that deny basic human capacities, in this case sexual pleasure, are unacceptable and should be combatted in whatever ways seem most likely to be effective.

The collection moves away from international issues with the fifth essay, “American Women: Preferences, Feminism, Democracy.” Here, Nussbaum addresses charges against feminism made by philosopher Christina Hoff Sommers – namely, allegations that feminism is illiberal and antidemocratic. Nussbaum argues that feminism has benefitted American women, especially with regard to the seriousness with which the courts treat cases of sexual violence and sexual harassment. She concludes, in response to Sommers’ charges, that feminist views do not represent a radical threat to democracy but are in fact very much in line with mainstream liberalism. From this defense of feminism, Nussbaum moves to a consideration of the role of emotion in justice. In an essay entitled “Equity and Mercy,” Nussbaum uses Andrea Dworkin’s novel *Mercy* as a jumping-off point for a discussion that ranges from Aristotle and the Stoic philosopher Seneca to Charles Dickens’s *David Copperfield* and the uses of the concept of mercy in judicial reasoning. The first section closes with an essay entitled “A Defense of Lesbian and Gay Rights,” in which Nussbaum advocates a civil public dialogue on the issue of gay and lesbian rights, a dialogue that privileges reason rather than prejudice.

The second section of the book is entitled “Sex,” but the essays within it also address issues of justice. The section opens with an essay on “Objectification” in which Nussbaum takes on the feminist concept of sexual objectification. She offers examples from literature as way to delineate seven ways in which it is possible to treat a person, either a sexual partner or a potential sexual partner, as a thing. Nussbaum suggests that the notion of objectification is “not only a slippery but a multiple concept.” This multiplicity leads to a variety of conclusions. “Under some specifications,” Nussbaum writes, “objectification . . . is always morally problematic. Under other specifications, objectification has features that may be either good or bad, depending on the overall context Some features of objectification, furthermore, . . . may in fact in some circumstances . . . be either necessary or wonderful features of sexual life” (p. 214). Nussbaum identifies the presence of the concept of objectification in feminist thought with the work of Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, and the second essay in this section, “Rage and Reason,” offers a critique of Andrea Dworkin’s *Life and Death*. Nussbaum characterizes the book as being written in a prophetic mode that avoids the calm, reasoned persuasion that Nussbaum values so highly. This critique of Dworkin is followed by one of the most eloquent essays in this volume, “Constructing Love, Desire, and Care.” Here, Nussbaum joins a thorough understanding of ancient Greek culture with a passionate defense of desire and sexual feeling to mobilize a powerful argument for the constructedness of these elements of human existence that are so often naturalized.

The next essay, “‘Whether from Reason or Prejudice’: Taking Money for Bodily Services,” constitutes an argument for the legalization of prostitution. It is followed by “Platonic Love and Colorado Law: The Relevance of Ancient Greek Norms to Modern Sexual Controversies,” another of the more eloquent essays in the volume. Here, Nussbaum argues that contemporary American judges would benefit from knowledge of ancient Greek sexual norms. Such knowledge, she argues, would mitigate against decisions in which judges treat contemporary American prejudices against homosexuality as eternal and unchanging norms. The next two essays, “Sex, Truth, and Solitude,” and “Sex, Liberty, and Economics,” are both book reviews. The first discusses a memoir by classicist Sir Kenneth Dover and constitutes a tribute to the man whose work on Greek sexuality is the foundation of contemporary work in the history of sexuality. The present volume is dedicated to Dover, and Nussbaum’s admiration of the man and his work both come through clearly in the review. The closing essay in this volume presents the marital relationship of Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay in Virginia Woolf’s *To the Lighthouse* as a model for knowledge of the other. Nussbaum presents this kind of knowledge as an ethical question rather than an epistemological one. Such an ethical problem, she proposes, gives us an opportunity to put ourselves in the place of the other, an exercise that Nussbaum sees as central to the project of justice, a project that she equates with love.

By the time the reader reaches this final essay, she is still likely to find herself asking the question, What is the relationship between sex and justice? She might ask what determines whether an essay belongs in the section on justice or the one on sex. If the principle is that there should be no distinctions with regard to justice based on differences grounded in sex (either gender or sexual orientation), then why divide the book at all? Are there organizational principles that unite each part? If the first section constitutes an effort to explicate the principles behind the author’s definition of justice, what point does the author seek to make in the second? As a whole, in fact, this collection of essays suffers from the disjointedness that often characterizes such volumes. Despite the apparent straightforwardness of the declared theme, it is often difficult to discern the thread that holds the volume together. In part as a result of the great breadth and scope of the author’s interests and scholarship, the book seems to end far from where it began. Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay are a long way from India and Bangladesh, and not only in terms of geography. Or are they? If love in the form of generosity and a genuine desire to understand people we perceive as wholly other is the answer Nussbaum seeks to prescribe as she delineates the issues surrounding sex and justice, there could be no more appropriate way to end this book.

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Social Justice/Criminal Justice: The Maturation of Critical Theory in Law, Crime, and Deviance edited by Bruce A. Arrigo, Belmont, CA: West/Wadsworth, 1999, 288 pages, \$33.95 (paper).

Society is fixated on controlling crime. From hiring additional police officers to building more prisons, we constantly seek to reduce crime in our neighborhoods. Most of our attempts to control crime involve the development and application of criminal laws, with criminal justice personnel faced with determining and administering justice. When crime rates rise, more

draconian laws are passed, additional police are hired, judges become increasingly punitive, and more prisons are built. Unfortunately, we overlook a significant limitation regarding the efficacy of the current criminal justice system: it has its basis in a reactive process. As such, we largely rely upon alleviating the crime problem by *responding* to illegal behaviors, rather than assuming a more proactive approach that considers what happens before the crime occurs. Arguably, increased incarceration rates require that we consider non-traditional approaches in our dealings with crime.

I contend that we consider the larger picture in response to crime. By this I mean that we should look beyond traditional reactions to alarming crime and incarceration rates and consider novel means to achieving true justice. Doing so would require utilizing innovative theoretical approaches to crime and the administration of justice. In this regard, criminologists might take into account the critical arguments offered by the contributors to Bruce Arrigo's *Social Justice/Criminal Justice*.

As part of the Wadsworth Contemporary Issues in Crime and Justice Series, this volume is a resourceful starting point for criminologists to consider non-traditional approaches to addressing crime. Thirteen clearly-written and well-organized chapters addressing various critical criminological viewpoints enable readers to clearly understand and consider social justice in relation to criminal justice. The chapters are replete with well-chosen examples that assist readers in understanding the relationship between social and criminal justice. Additionally, a detailed glossary at the end of the book will no doubt prove helpful to readers unfamiliar with concepts peculiar to the theoretical approaches discussed. As clearly stated by Arrigo, "this book, then, is an effort to learn something more about social justice" (p. 3).

Although not a comprehensive account of critical criminological perspectives (as Arrigo openly admits), the selections are nonetheless truly cutting edge. The book begins with an Introduction containing an insightful account of social justice and critical criminology written by Arrigo, which, among other contributions, enables readers to further understand what is meant by "social justice." Moreover, it provides a helpful discussion of the history and development of critical theory and clearly presents the noted relationship between social and criminal justice. In addition to the quality essays, one of the many strengths of this collection is that Arrigo contextualizes each of the chapters. Further, he synthesizes a synthesis of each perspective's view of social and criminal justice (as found in the final chapter).

The Introduction is followed by well-selected contributions from many reputable scholars in the field. Arrigo deliberately avoids providing a strict dose of Marxist thought, instead presenting a variety of critical perspectives. The chapters, in order, address the following areas: "Marxist Criminology and Social Justice" (Michael J. Lynch and Paul Stretesky), "Socialist Feminist Criminology and Social Justice" (Nancy C. Jurik), "Peacemaking Criminology and Social Justice" (Hal Pepinsky), "Prophetic Criticism and Social Justice" (Richard Quinney), "Anarchist Criminology and Social Justice" (Jeff Ferrell), "Postmodern Feminist Criminology and Social Justice" (Nancy A. Wonders), "Semiotics and Social Justice" (Peter K. Manning), "Constitutive Criminology and Social Justice" (Gregg Barak and Stuart Henry), "Critical Race Theory and Social Justice" (Katheryn K. Russell), "Chaos Theory and Social Justice" (T. R. Young), "Catastrophe/Topology Theory and Social Justice" (Dragan Milovanovic), "Queer Theory and Social Justice" (Brett Stockdill), and "Critical Social Justice: An Integration" (Arrigo). Those familiar with critical criminology will readily recognize the expertise of these contributors.

Anthologies frequently leave readers yearning for a sense of closure. While such works provide a wealth of information, little effort is made by the editors to "tie it all together." Typically, attempts to integrate the material precede the essays, when, arguably, such information would be better placed at the conclusion of the text. Arrigo deals with this limitation by providing an Introduction as well as a concluding chapter that aids readers in comparing and

contrasting the theoretical perspectives, while also integrating them and advancing our understanding of social justice. Among other things, the final chapter synthesizes the various theoretical approaches while assessing areas of convergence and divergence with regard to their core themes, and locates these findings within the context of conventional criminal justice. Arrigo concludes that “conventional police, court, and correctional practices impede the progress of critical social justice” (p. 271), adding that critical social justice and criminal justice “were shown to be fundamentally at odds with one another” (p. 271).

Critics of the book are likely to be those mainstream criminologists who generally discount critical theoretical approaches. In accordance with historical practices, conventional criminologists will likely question the feasibility of altering our approach to justice as proposed by the volume’s contributors. Perhaps (in a policy-oriented manner, or through hypothetical, yet potentially realistic scenarios) a follow-up text could address these concerns by explaining what, specifically, is required in implementing such changes. Nevertheless, the present volume has a great deal to offer, with each chapter and author making strong arguments that should, at the very least, encourage readers to consider these approaches.

The book is best suited for an upper-level undergraduate, or a graduate-level “critical theory” and/or “social justice” course. While some chapters are easier to follow than others (and some contributors are more successful than others at presenting their particular approach), advanced college students should have little difficulty understanding the material. A summary account preceding each chapter facilitates comprehension. The text is also useful for researchers interested in comparing various critical theories, and those interested in understanding how to integrate these theoretical approaches. Moreover, anyone seeking to further understand critical theories, particularly as they relate to social and criminal justice, will also appreciate this text.

Social Justice/Criminal Justice contributes a great deal to the literature on critical criminology. It inspires one to consider potential empirical tests of these approaches, which will help advance this area of study. The book also encourages one to further recognize and appreciate the potential of non-conventional criminological theories, their similarities and dissimilarities. Finally, the text offers suggestions for improving our system of justice while recognizing (but not harping on) the limitations of our current approach.

Most readers will inevitably think about criminal justice in a different manner. Providing a step toward the disruption of society’s “tunnel vision” with regard to crime, justice, law and the criminal justice system is perhaps the greatest contribution offered by this collection of essays. Substantial structural changes are required if society is truly intent on reducing crime and ensuring justice in our society. Although simply tinkering with the current reactive system may provide periods of encouragement, lasting benefits require addressing the root of the problem. This can be done by opening our minds in our attempts to understand *why* crime exists, while ensuring equal treatment of all persons. As Arrigo aptly concludes, “The project that lies ahead, in both theory and practice, is to liberate law, crime, and deviance principles from the constraints of conventional wisdom and understanding. The practice of criminal justice needs to be more consistent with the philosophy of critical social justice” (p. 271). Upon reading *Social Justice/Criminal Justice* many will agree with Arrigo’s statement, or at least lean more in his direction.

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